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wines: a pomegranate wine and a grape wine. We varied on a between subjects basis the size
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1 Introduction
Although it is widely known that wine has been produced for thousands of years, it is
less well known among ordinary consumers that wine is not always made of grape. Mead, for
example, although not classified as wine, is created with a similar process to wine from fer-
menting honey with water (sometimes with various fruits and spices) and has been produced
in Europe, Africa and Asia as far back in time as wine (Toussaint-Samat, 2009). Wherever
grapes were scarce, fruit wine making blossomed (Schneider, 2007) and in modern times
fruit wine has come to mean any fermented alcoholic beverage made from any plant matter
that can be fermented. This definition usually excludes beer, mead, cider and perry which
historically constitute separate categories.
The market size for fruit wines is not easy to determine, however, since most fruit wines
are sweet, the size of the dessert wine category is often used as a proxy. Although the sweet
wine market has been estimated to be just 2% of the global wine market (Rivard, 2009, pp.
13), non-grape wines represented the fastest growing sector of the US wine industry since
demand for fruit wines grew by more than 89% in 2014 (Anonymous, 2015).1
Given the small but growing nature of the fruit wine industry, knowledge of consumer
preferences can be very important for proper targeting consumers segments that are more
likely to purchase fruit wines at a given price. When it comes to (fruit) wines, it is of-
ten not enough to increase consumer awareness by providing information for those salient
characteristics that may affect choices. Sensory characteristics of wines can be very impor-
tant elements of repeat purchases, therefore, studying the combined effect of information
and sensory evaluations may provide unique insights of the importance of both sensory and
information cues in marketing research (Combris et al., 2009).
For wines in particular, sensory evaluation is an important element guiding the consumer-
driven winemaking process (Lesschaeve, 2007) and has often been explored in relation to
wine market prices (see Goldstein et al., 2008; Granato et al., 2011; Lecocq and Visser,
2006, among others). Agricultural economists pay special attention to the determination of
pricing strategies by using a plethora of methods to uncover consumers’ willingness to pay
(WTP). Experimental economics methods, like auctions (Lusk and Shogren, 2007), have
often been used in order to elicit consumers’ valuation for wines or wine specific attributes.
For example, Lecocq et al. (2005) used a Vickrey auction in order to investigate the impact of
information on bids for four red wines (two Bordeaux and two Burgundy wines) and found
a higher WTP when subjects were provided with information about the wines after first
1A similar statement about fruit wines being the fastest growing sector in Europe, can be found in the
website of the European Cider and Fruit wine Association but without specific numbers backing up the
claim.
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blind tasting the wines. However, when information was provided before tasting, tasting
did not exert a significant effect on WTP. More recently, Vecchio (2013) used a 5th price
Vickrey auction to determine price premiums for sustainable wines (Protected Geographical
Indication wines from Sicily) and Bazoche et al. (2008) used the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak
mechanism to study the impact of information about pesticide use in farming on WTP for
four Bordeaux wines.
A variety of marketing tools like packaging, bottle shapes, designer labels and advertising
(Boudreaux and Palmer, 2007; de Mello and Pires, 2009) are used by wineries to convince
consumers that their wines are worth a higher price. However, little work has been done on
the signaling effect of bottle size formats on implied quality of the good. From the perspective
of economics, as long as the quality of the good is unchanged, when examining marginal
increases in the quantity of a good, the price a consumer is WTP for the marginal increase
should be progressively lower due to diminishing marginal utility. If, on the other hand,
(perceived) quality differs because of changes in the quantity of the good, then diminishing
marginal utility is not relevant to explain price premium differences. Perception of quality
with respect to quantity is summarized in the popular proverb “Good things come in small
packages” which is to say that the size of goods doesn’t always indicate their quality; smaller
things often have better quality than larger ones.
The notion that prices may convey quality signals is well known in the behavioral market-
ing literature (Rao and Monroe, 1989), however, the relation of bottle size formats and prices
are not well established. In a related paper, Outreville (2011) studied posted prices found on
company’s websites of several Champagne producers (e.g., Dom Perignon, Moet-Chandon,
Deutz etc.) for a variety of bottle formats (from Demi (375ml) and Jennie (500ml) bottle
formats to Nabuchodonosor (15L) bottles). He found that smaller Champagne bottles are
sold for a higher normalized price relative to the 750ml format. Similar results were obtained
for Bordeaux and Burgundy wines. On the other hand, Brunke et al. (2009) found no effect
of smaller than 750ml bottle formats on prices of wines offered for sale at auction markets
in Germany.
To test whether the bottle size format signals quality changes, we used a controlled
laboratory experiment where we simultaneously auctioned two different sweet wines: a
pomegranate wine and a grape wine. We varied on a between subjects basis the size of
the bottle, from 500ml to 750ml but kept the wine content of the bottle constant across
bottle size formats. For the grape wine we find that subjects are willing to pay more for the
increased quantity but that the premium increase is consistent with diminishing marginal
utility. For the pomegranate wine, our estimates imply a premium for the smaller bottle size
which is consistent with changes in perceived quality of the wine due to changes in perceived
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scarcity.
Besides bottle size effects, we also explore in a within subjects design the effect of prior
expectations (Visual treatment), blind tasting (Sensory treatment) and information (Infor-
mation treatment) on WTP for the two wines. We find that tasting has a negative effect
on WTP with respect to expectations from the visual first stage but that information about
wines offsets the negative effect of the taste (Sensory) treatment. In the next section we
present our experimental design, and proceed with the statistical and econometric analysis
in Section 3. We conclude in the final section.
2 Experimental design
Our experiment combined characteristics of a within- and a between-subjects design
(Charness et al., 2012). In June/July 2015, a marketing research company recruited for
us adult subjects (≥18 years old) from the general population in Athens, Greece, with the
understanding that they will participate in a marketing research of approximately one hour
at the university campus. Consumers were screened over their various consumption habits
and only consumers with no allergies associated with food/drink consumption that stated
to drink at least one glass of wine twice per week and buy a bottle of wine at least once
a month were invited to participate. In all, 160 subjects participated in our experiment
over 17 sessions (all but two sessions were conducted with 10 subjects/session). In ad-
dition subjects were asked not to smoke, eat or drink anything except water at least 1.5
hours before their session in order to avoid any influence of their taste perception from
prior cigarette/food/beverage consumption. Sessions were spread over all weekdays (except
Sunday) and throughout the morning and afternoon hours, in order to accommodate re-
spondents with various time schedules. The experiment was fully computerized using zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
Upon arrival, subjects were given a consent form to sign and when all subjects necessary
to form an auction group had arrived (subjects participated in auction groups of 5 subjects),
they were randomly seated to one of the PC private booths. Printed instructions were given
to all subjects and the experimenter read aloud instructions. Subjects were specifically
instructed to raise their hand and ask any questions in private and that the experimenter
would then share her answer with the group. Subjects received a show-up fee of e10 and
another e10 upon successful completion of the experiment. Subjects could earn or lose money
during the experiment (described momentarily), so that average total payouts were e25.7
(S.D.=3.90, min=8, max=40). After instructions were read aloud, subjects filled a series of
computerized control questions to enhance comprehension of instructions. They were free to
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advise their printed instructions or ask questions to the experimenter and generally showed
a good understanding with an average of 10.5 correct answers out of 12 questions.
The experiment consisted of three stages (experimental instructions are reproduced in
English in Appendix C). Stage 3 involved two risk preference elicitation tasks. These data
will be analyzed elsewhere and are not further discussed here. In Stage 1 subjects went
through a typical real effort task where they had to count and report the number of zeros
shown in a 4×4 matrix. This task was repeated 10 times (the elements of the matrix where
random and changed with each repetition but was the same for all subjects at a given
repetition) and subjects could earn e0.5 every time they correctly solved the task within
30 seconds. The task aimed at mitigating house money effects by making subjects earn
part of their endowment (e..g., Corgnet et al., 2014; Jacquemet et al., 2009). The task was
purposefully made easy (as evident by the fact that earned real effort money averaged e4.83
with a standard deviation of 0.31 and that 73.8% and 20.6% of subjects earned exactly e5
and e4.5, respectively), so that subjects would start off in Stage 2 of the experiment with
approximately equal endowments.
In Stage 2 subjects participated in a series of 2nd price Vickrey auctions (Vickrey, 1961)
in groups of 5 subjects. Matching in groups was random and remained the same throughout
the session. Subjects were unaware of which other subjects in the session composed their
group. The group size was decided with three things in mind: a) avoid disengaging off-margin
bidders from the auction procedure (Shogren et al., 2001) by having ‘too large’ groups b)
given that price feedback in repeated 2nd price auctions is discouraged (Corrigan et al.,
2012), avoid ‘too small’ groups that would, by design, easily reveal bidding behavior of other
subjects and c) increase the number of independent observations (if we count the auction
group as the unit of an independent observation). In addition, recent theoretical (Banerji and
Gupta, 2014) and empirical studies (Rosato and Tymula, 2016) have shown that if subjects
have reference dependent preferences then the equilibrium bid is lower when the number of
bidders is larger. Thus, by keeping the number of bidders constant we eliminate a possible
confound.
The mechanics of the auction were explained in the instructions. In order to ensure that
the procedure was fully understood, three hypothetical training rounds for two non-focal food
products were conducted: a pack of biscuits and a chocolate bar (pictures of the products
as shown to the subjects can be found in Appendix B; pictures B.2a and B.2b). Bids were
entered simultaneously for the two goods. The purpose of the training rounds was to closely
mimic the real auctions rounds that followed.
Right after the training rounds, subjects were served with 40 ml of each of the two wines
in ISO wine tasting glasses (see picture B.1). Wines were only identified by a three digit
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number at this stage. Subjects were reminded that wines should be tasted only when they
are instructed to do so. Research assistants in the lab made sure that everyone followed this
rule and, as a consequence, we didn’t observe anyone breaking it. The real auction rounds
that followed, consisted of three within-subjects treatments: the Visual, the Sensory and the
Information treatment (see Figure 1). Subjects went progressively from the Visual, to the
Sensory and to the Information treatment. Each of the within-subjects treatments involved
three repetitions of a 2nd price auction for the two wines for a total of nine rounds. Subjects
were told that only one round and one product would be randomly selected for each auction
group at the end of the session using a bingo cage. Just before each three-round auction
repetition, subjects completed hedonic evaluations for both wines (on a scale from 1 to 9)
as well as paired comparisons.2
In the first within-subjects treatment (Visual treatment), subjects were asked to observe
the two wines and evaluate them based on their expectation of liking each wine (presentation
order of wines was randomized between-subjects). Subjects then bid in three repeated auc-
tion rounds their WTP to buy a bottle of each wine. In the second within-subjects treatment
(Sensory treatment), subjects were asked to first taste and then evaluate each wine. The or-
der of tasting of the wines was randomized for each subject by receiving private instructions
on their screen and subjects were instructed to rinse their mouths using water before tasting
the second wine. Subjects then bid again in three repeated auction rounds. In the third
within-subjects treatment (Information treatment), subjects were given information about
each wine, they saw pictures of the wines in their computer screens (shown in Appendix B:
pictures B.3a, B.3b, B.3c and B.3d) and real bottles of wines were circulated in the lab for
subjects to observe closely if they wished to do so. The information given in this treatment
was the actual information written on the labels of the bottles which included information
about the grape and pomegranate variety, growth location of the fruits, bottling location
and serving advise3.
2In sensory evaluation analysis, any given sensory attribute is seen as having two basic underlying scales:
a scale of magnitude and a scale of dissimilarity. Because discrimination changes with the magnitude of
the stimulus difference, category scale data are expected to be non-linearly related to magnitude scale. The
magnitude of attributes is often measured by means of nine-point ordinal scales which have been repeatedly
assessed for their reliability and validity (Stone and Sidel, 2004, pp. 88). Discrimination testing seeks to
answer the question of whether two products are perceived as different. This is often measured through a
paired comparison test asking subjects to indicate which product they prefer (or whether they are indifferent
between products). These tests are viewed as particularly informative when there are changes in choices
patterns after a change in the task (Stone and Sidel, 2004, pp. 150), similar to what is accomplished with
our within-subjects treatments.
3For the pomegranate wine the information indicated that the pomegranate juice comes from the local
Ermioni variety, grown in the island of Evia where the wine is also fermented and bottled. For the grape
wine the information indicated that the wine comes from juice from the variety ‘Muscat of Alexandria’,
fermented and bottled in the island of Limnos.
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Visual
Wine evaluation
3 auction rounds
Sensory
Wine evaluation
3 auction rounds
Information
Wine evaluation
3 auction rounds
Figure 1: Within-subjects treatments
Furthermore, in order to examine bottle size effects, we varied on a between-subjects
basis the bottle size of the wines at two levels: a standard 750 ml bottle and a 500 ml bottle.
Table 1 shows the number of subjects participating in each cell of this 2×2 experimental
design. Subjects knew from the very beginning of the auction the size of the bottles for
each wine they were bidding on. This information was also discretely reminded during the
bidding stage with appropriate descriptive text in their computer screens. Both wines were
bottled and labeled on demand by their producers for the purpose of this experiment.
Table 1: Between-subjects treatments
Pomegranate wine
500 ml 750 ml
Grape wine
500 ml 40 subjects 40 subjects
750 ml 40 subjects 40 subjects
3 Results
The essence of experimentation is the ability to establish exogeneity of the treatment by
comparing groups of subjects that have the same expectation in the distribution of all covari-
ates which are potentially relevant for the treatment outcome. Typically, before presenting
any results, experimenters perform balance tests as a scrutiny test for randomization success.
With our data we fail to reject the null of no difference for the between-subjects treatments
at α = 5% significance level for age (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 0.071, p-value = 0.995), body
mass index constructed from self-reported weight and height (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 0.096,
p-value = 0.992), gender (Pearson’s χ2 = 1.117, p-value = 0.773), education level (Fisher’s
exact p-value = 0.614), household size (Pearson’s χ2 = 10.810, p-value = 0.545), smoking
status (Fisher’s exact p-value = 0.718), consumption frequency of alcoholic drinks in gen-
eral (Pearson’s χ2 = 2.438, p-value = 0.883) and wine in particular (Pearson’s χ2 = 3.174,
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p-value = 0.366), number of alcoholic drinks consumed in a typical day (Fisher’s exact
p-value0.883) and income levels (Fisher’s exact p-value = 0.069). 4
3.1 Hedonic evaluation of wines
We first start by analyzing the hedonic score data for wine evaluations. Figure 2 shows
histograms of wine evaluations for each wine, pooled over all treatments. It is obvious that
the grape wine is evaluated better than the pomegranate wine and although the figure pools
the data over all treatments, a similar picture emerges if one examines score differences
on a treatment by treatment basis (see figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A). We can
use a Sign test to calculate the differences between the hedonic scores for the two wines
and test the null hypothesis that the median of the differences is zero. The null is highly
rejected (p-value < 0.001) over the one sided alternative that the median of the difference:
Hedonic score grape wine−Hedonic score pomegranate wine > 0. The null is highly rejected
as well (p-value = 0.004), if we do the test separately for each within-subjects treatment.
We can further examine the factors that affect hedonic score evaluations by means of
random effects ordered logit regressions which are shown in Table 2 (Table A.1 in Appendix A
shows results with additional controls added in the model specification). Table 2 depicts
results separately for each type of wine as well as a pooled model. The pooled model interacts
the treatment dummies with the wine dummy (Grape wine) to examine any differential
treatment effects across products.
For one, we can see in Table 2 that the Information treatment boosts hedonic scores
for both wines with respect to the Visual treatment. In addition, tasting improves hedonic
evaluation of the grape wine when compared with evaluation based on expectations only.
However, tasting does little in that direction for the pomegranate wine. Second, the pooled
model shows a positive and statistically significant effect for the grape wine dummy which
indicates an overall liking in favor of the grape wine. The interaction terms for the within
subjects treatments indicate that the Sensory and Information treatment effects are larger
in size for the grape wine as compared to the pomegranate wine.
Paired comparison data are depicted in Figure 3. The question we seek to answer is
4Although such balance tests are popular and almost mandated by reviewers, we should note that it is
debatable whether they are really meaningful. For example, Ho et al. (2007) categorize such tests under
the term ‘the Balance Test Fallacy’. Their main point is that ‘. . . balance is a characteristic of the observed
sample, not some hypothetical population’ and that ‘the idea that hypothesis tests are useful for checking
balance is therefore incorrect.’ Mutz and Pemantle (2015) note that randomization is a process rather
than an outcome and that the intuition that ‘. . . formal tests [. . . ] may be useful to detect errors in the
implementation of randomization [. . . ] are not, in and of themselves, sufficient evidence of a randomization
problem.’ They conclude that the process of randomization is either done correctly or not; there is no middle
ground.
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Table 2: Random effects ordered logit models of hedonic evaluations
Pomegranate
wine
Grape wine Pooled model
with clustered
standard errors
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape: 500ml 0.113 -0.418 0.158
(0.723) (0.554) (0.249)
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape: 750ml 0.567 -0.027 0.315
(0.725) (0.556) (0.231)
Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape: 500ml 0.276 0.555 0.197
(0.724) (0.556) (0.240)
Sensory treatment -0.401∗ 0.783∗∗∗ -0.214
(0.216) (0.222) (0.214)
Information treatment 0.894∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗
(0.221) (0.232) (0.202)
Grape wine 0.737∗∗∗
(0.257)
(Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape: 500ml)× Grape wine -0.350
(0.285)
(Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape: 750ml)× Grape wine -0.324
(0.272)
(Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape: 500ml)× Grape wine 0.167
(0.303)
Sensory treatment× Grape wine 0.695∗∗∗
(0.254)
Information treatment× Grape wine 0.417∗
(0.233)
Gender -0.547 -0.832∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(0.518) (0.399) (0.136)
Age 0.049∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018) (0.006)
σ2u 9.137
∗∗∗ 4.790∗∗∗
(1.599) (0.935)
Observations 480 480 960
Log-likelihood -796.788 -707.661 -1703.873
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base categories are:
(Pomegranate wine: 750ml, Grape wine: 750ml), Visual treatment.
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Figure 2: Hedonic evaluation scores by wine
whether the two types of wine are perceived as dissimilar at each of the within-subjects
treatments. Besides the visual dissimilarity, which is more pronounced in the Visual treat-
ment (i.e., subjects are shown to prefer the grape wine more than the pomegranate wine),
we can test whether the observed percentages are significantly different from expected per-
centages using a χ2 goodness of fit test. For the Visual treatment when we test whether the
observed percentages (49.38% prefer the grape wine and 30% prefer the pomegranate wine)
are different than an equal split between the two wines (i.e., 50% to prefer the grape wine
and 50% to prefer the pomegranate wine), we reject the null (χ2 = 12.13, p-value = 0.007).
Although in the Sensory treatment there is a shift toward the pomegranate wine, we fail to
reject the null (χ2 = 5.52, p-value = 0.137) of an equal split between the two wines. The shift
toward preferring the pomegranate wine is further reinforced in the Information treatment
and the observed difference in favor of the pomegranate wine is statistically different than
an equal split of subjects between the two wines (χ2 = 6.25, p-value = 0.044). Furthermore,
a Pearson χ2 test of whether choice in the paired comparison is not related to the within
subjects treatments, rejects the null (χ2 = 19.48, p-value = 0.003) which indicates that the
within subjects treatments exert a statistically significant effect on paired comparison.
In a conditional analysis context, the factors that affect choice in the paired comparison
test can be examined by means of a multinomial logit model. Results are shown in Ta-
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Figure 3: Paired comparisons of wines by within-subjects treatment
ble 3 (Table A.2 in Appendix A shows results with additional controls added in the model
specification). Results reconfirm Figure 3. The Sensory and Information treatments exert
a statistically significant effect and the negative sign indicates it is less likely that someone
will choose the grape wine over the pomegranate wine as compared to the Visual treatment.
That is, the negative coefficients for the within subjects treatments highlight the shift to-
ward the pomegranate wine illustrated in Figure 3. In addition, when we test for a difference
between the Sensory and the Information treatment coefficients, we fail to reject the null for
the outcomes ‘Choose the grape wine’ and ‘Like both wines equally well’.
3.2 Descriptive analysis of bids
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of bids per treatment for each type of wine. For the
pomegranate wine there are two observations to be made. First, across all between-subjects
treatments, bids decrease in the Sensory treatment (after tasting) as compared to the Visual
treatment but are increased above the level of bids in the Visual treatment when information
about the wine is provided. Second, the pomegranate wine is valued more when in a 500ml
bottle format and competes with a 750ml bottle of grape wine. For the grape wine there
is a linear relationship of bids with the within subjects treatments, that is, bids increase in
the Sensory treatment and are further increased in the Information treatment. With respect
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Table 3: Multinomial logit model for pairwise comparisons
Choose grape wine Like both wines equally well No choice
Constant 0.518 -1.930∗∗ -1.779
(0.618) (0.845) (1.374)
Pom: 500ml, Grape: 500ml -0.679∗ 0.132 1.293
(0.368) (0.525) (0.883)
Pom: 500ml, Grape: 750ml -0.011 0.661 0.787
(0.363) (0.504) (0.928)
Pom: 750ml, Grape: 500ml -0.399 0.198 -0.217
(0.354) (0.516) (1.055)
Sensory treatment -0.614∗∗ -0.693∗∗ -0.238
(0.256) (0.308) (0.439)
Information treatment -0.729∗∗∗ -0.439 -15.181∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.337) (0.418)
Gender 0.225 -0.115 0.469
(0.252) (0.352) (0.622)
Age 0.002 0.024 -0.023
(0.012) (0.015) (0.025)
Observations 480
Log-likelihood -518.418
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ‘Choose pomegranate
wine’ is the base outcome. Base categories are: (Pom: 750ml, Grape: 750ml), Visual treatment.
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to bottle size effects, the grape wine is valued more when it is bottled in a 750ml bottle
and competes with a 500ml bottle of pomegranate wine. Table 4 is complemented with
appropriate statistical tests for treatment effects (i.e., the Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal and
Wallis, 1952), the K-sample median test (Mood, 1954) and the Friedman test (Friedman,
1937, 1939)) that reveal statistically significant treatment effects. We quantify these effects
in a regression context momentarily.
The bottle size effects are graphically depicted in Figure 4 which shows average bids over
rounds and over the within subjects treatments per bottle size and wine type. It is obvious
that there is an inverse relation between bottle size and valuations for pomegranate wine
which is more pronounced in the Information treatment. For the grape wine, there is a
positive relationship between bottle size and valuations which remains stable over the within
subjects treatments.
Figure 4: Average bids per round and treatment
3.3 Econometric analysis
To check whether the results obtained above hold in the context of conditional analysis
as well as to quantify treatment effects, we estimated random effects regression models
where the grouping structure of the data consists of three levels of nested groups (i.e., three
13
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random effects): the auction group, j, the individual, i, and the auction round, t. The model
specification we estimate is of the form:
Bidjit = xjitb+ uj + vji + εjit (1)
where j = 1 . . . J indexes the auction groups, i = i . . . N indexes individuals in an auction
group, t = 1 . . . T indexes auction rounds (in our case J = 32, N = 160 and T = 9) and x
is a vector of independent variables. The random effects, uj, vji and εjit are i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
u),
N(0, σ2v) and N(0, σ
2
ε), respectively and independently of each other.
In addition, about 5.5% of all bids for the pomegranate wine is exactly zero. This calls
for the use of a censored regression model for the pomegranate wine to address possible
censoring from the left (Tobit model). The Tobit model complicates slightly the analysis
since there are four marginal effect that the researcher might be interested in: a) marginal
effects on the latent variable, ∂E[Bid
∗|x]
∂x
(these are the raw coefficient estimates) b) on the
observed variable, ∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
c) on positive bids, ∂E[Bid|Bid>0,x]
∂x
and d) on the probability of
being uncensored, ∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
. For the grape wine, zero bids are a small fraction of total
observations (0.7%), therefore we estimate a random effects linear regression model.
Results are exhibited in Table 5 (Table A.3 in Appendix A shows results with additional
demographic and attitudinal variables added in the model specification). Last column shows
results from the linear regression model while all the other columns show marginal effects
from the Tobit model identified by appropriate headings.
We first start with the results from the within-subjects treatments. For the grape wine,
bids increase statistically significantly after tasting (Sensory treatment) and further increase
after information is revealed (Information treatment). A Wald test of whether the coefficients
for the Sensory and Information treatments are statistically different, fails to reject the null
(χ2 = 1.51, p-value = 0.218), which indicates that the two treatments have a similar effect
on bids as compared to the Visual (baseline) treatment. In terms of magnitude, the effects
are rather small: e0.22 and e0.35 for the Sensory and Information treatments, respectively.
For the pomegranate wine, the effect in the Sensory treatment is statistically significant
and negative but rather small in magnitude. For example, for those that bid positively,
tasting the pomegranate wine reduces bids by e0.21. In addition, the likelihood of someone
bidding a positive amount is reduced after tasting by 1.4%. The information treatment
does not exert a statistically or economically significant effect with respect to the Visual
treatment. This result illustrates a U-shaped effect of the within-subjects treatments on
bidding behavior where bids are first decreased after tasting (Sensory treatment) but then
are brought back to the level of the Visual treatment after information is revealed in the
Information treatment.
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For the between-subjects treatments (designed to examine bottle size effects) we find a
negative effect on the grape wine for the smaller bottle size format. For example, when
compared to a treatment where grape wine is bottled in a 750ml bottle, the 500ml bottle
is valued e1.58 and e1.24 less in the two respective treatments. Although the effect is
statistically significant at the 10% for one of the treatments, when we control for additional
factors (Table A.3 in Appendix A) both treatment effects are statistically significant. In any
case, the size of the effects is substantial. In terms of average predicted WTP, we find that a
500ml grape wine is valued at e4.52 while a 750ml bottle at e6.49, which implies a premium
of 43.6% for an increase in volume of 50%.
The picture with respect to bottle size effects is reversed for the pomegranate wine.
Table 5 shows that with respect to the treatment where both wines have a bottle size of
750ml, no other treatment differs statistically significantly. This implies, however, that a
500ml is valued at least as much as a 750ml bottle which, given the volume difference,
implies a premium for the bottle size of 500ml on a per Liter basis. In terms of average
predicted valuations, conditional on bidding positively, a 500ml pomegranate wine is valued
at e5.59 whereas a 750ml bottle is valued at e5.25, which implies a 6.08% discount for an
increase of 50% in volume. That is, the producer is better off by selling 500ml bottles of
pomegranate wine.
The effect sizes in Table 5 show that the premium that a smaller bottle size of pomegranate
wine can gain, is higher if the pomegranate wine is paired with a bigger bottle size of grape
wine. This is likely due to a comparison effect which makes the smaller bottle size look even
better for the pomegranate wine when it is compared with a large bottle of grape wine.
Table 5: Random effects Tobit model (pomegranate wine) and random effects linear regres-
sion model (grape wine)
Pomegranate wine Grape wine
∂E[Bid∗|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|Bid>0,x]
∂x
∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
Constant 11.863∗∗∗ 12.440∗∗∗
(3.983) (3.937)
Pom: 500ml, Grape: 500ml -0.685 -0.598 -0.482 -0.037 -1.582∗
(0.941) (0.820) (0.663) (0.051) (0.881)
Pom: 500ml, Grape: 750ml 1.046 0.954 0.802 0.042 0.963
(0.944) (0.860) (0.724) (0.039) (0.884)
Pom: 750ml, Grape: 500ml -0.540 -0.473 -0.383 -0.028 -1.242
(0.943) (0.826) (0.669) (0.049) (0.884)
Sensory treatment -0.288∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗
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(0.104) (0.092) (0.075) (0.005) (0.111)
Information treatment -0.096 -0.085 -0.070 -0.005 0.355∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.093) (0.077) (0.005) (0.115)
Endwowment -2.619∗∗∗ -2.314∗∗∗ -1.899∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -2.233∗∗∗
(0.749) (0.663) (0.552) (0.040) (0.742)
Hedonic evaluation 0.726∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.004) (0.055)
Gender 0.119 0.105 0.086 0.006 -0.067
(0.458) (0.405) (0.332) (0.023) (0.455)
Age 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.001 -0.007
(0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.001) (0.022)
σu 1.420
∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.323)
σv 2.708
∗∗∗ 2.702∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.177)
σε 1.564
∗∗∗ 1.702∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034)
Observations 1440 1440
Log-likelihood -2845.039 -3073.426
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
4 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was twofold; first to investigate the impact of taste and
information on bids for the wines and second, to test whether bottle size formats for wines
signal quality changes.
First, we explored the effect of expectations, blind tasting and information on willingness
to pay for the two wines. We found that tasting has a negative effect on willingness to pay
but that information offsets this negative effect. This finding should be of particular interest
to the wine industry since it highlights that while taste is important, information provided
on the wine label is one of the key factors determining consumers’ WTP.
With respect to bottle size, results from a second price auction indicate that subjects
are willing to pay more for the increased quantity for the grape wine and that the pre-
mium increase is consistent with diminishing marginal utility. On the other hand, for the
17
pomegranate wine, our estimates imply a premium for the smaller bottle size which is consis-
tent with changes in perceived scarcity of the wine. The differential effect of bottle sizes for
different wine types implies that the quote that ‘good things come in small packages’ should
be evaluated on a product by product basis. Based on our findings, we endorse a modified
proverb: ‘Good things may come in small packages but sometimes bigger is better’.
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A Appendix: Additional tables/figures
Figure A.1: Hedonic evaluation scores (Visual treatment) by wine
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Figure A.2: Hedonic evaluation scores (Sensory treatment) by wine
Figure A.3: Hedonic evaluation scores (Information treatment) by wine
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Table A.1: Random effects ordered logit models of hedonic evaluations with additional
demographics
Pomegranate wine Grape wine Pooled model
with clustered
standard errors
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape: 500ml 0.432 -0.464 0.178
(0.770) (0.563) (0.250)
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape: 750ml 0.648 0.042 0.333
(0.749) (0.547) (0.258)
Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape: 500ml 0.191 0.262 0.135
(0.792) (0.580) (0.262)
Sensory treatment -0.377∗ 0.827∗∗∗ -0.191
(0.220) (0.225) (0.220)
Information treatment 0.892∗∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗
(0.226) (0.236) (0.209)
Grape wine 0.710∗∗∗
(0.274)
(Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape:
500ml)× Grape wine
-0.275
(0.303)
(Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape:
750ml)× Grape wine
-0.277
(0.291)
(Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape:
500ml)× Grape wine
0.066
(0.321)
Sensory treatment× Grape wine 0.711∗∗∗
(0.267)
Information treatment× Grape wine 0.471∗
(0.245)
Gender -0.956∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗
(0.570) (0.421) (0.154)
Age 0.069∗∗ 0.036 0.025∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.009)
Body Mass Index 0.007 0.007 -0.002
(0.065) (0.048) (0.020)
Education: University student 0.468 -0.338 0.041
(0.931) (0.677) (0.236)
Education: University graduate 0.481 0.223 0.192
(0.672) (0.492) (0.168)
Education: Post-grad student or
higher
1.261 0.906 0.554∗
(1.013) (0.748) (0.315)
Household size -0.570∗∗ -0.171 -0.157∗∗∗
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(0.229) (0.166) (0.058)
Income: Above average 0.862 -0.118 0.066
(0.882) (0.643) (0.233)
Income: Average 0.522 -0.248 -0.024
(0.834) (0.612) (0.232)
Income: Below average 0.386 -0.096 0.040
(1.000) (0.732) (0.314)
Smoking: No 0.240 0.719 0.306∗
(0.595) (0.438) (0.163)
Smoking: I’ve quit -1.006 0.121 -0.202
(1.230) (0.907) (0.285)
Alcohol consumption: 2 or 3 times
per week
-1.308∗ 0.681 -0.136
(0.757) (0.556) (0.240)
Alcohol consumption: 4 times a
week or more often
-0.825 1.109 0.162
(1.035) (0.762) (0.326)
N of drinks in a day: 3 or 4 0.130 0.294 0.096
(0.713) (0.526) (0.197)
Wine consumption: Once a week 0.227 -0.327 -0.058
(1.067) (0.779) (0.295)
Wine consumption: Twice a week 0.629 -1.380∗ -0.266
(1.076) (0.790) (0.316)
Wine consumption: 3-4 times a week 1.476 -0.746 0.147
(1.154) (0.844) (0.342)
Wine consumption: (almost) daily 1.012 -1.093 -0.102
(1.399) (1.023) (0.427)
σ2u 9.110
∗∗∗ 4.240∗∗∗
(1.611) (0.858)
Observations 468 468 936
Log-likelihood -756.887 -679.880 -1634.131
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base categories are:
(Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape: 750ml), Visual treatment, Education: up to senior hi-school,
Income: Good or very good, Smoking: Yes, Alcohol consumption: 2 or 4 times per month, N
of drinks in a day: 1 or 2, Wine consumption: Once every 15 days.
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Table A.2: Multinomial logit model for pairwise comparisons with additional demographics
Choose grape
wine
Like both wines
equally well
No choice
Constant 0.081 -1.303 -2.378
(1.277) (1.724) (2.657)
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape:
500ml
-0.893∗∗ 0.099 0.798
(0.417) (0.548) (1.088)
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape:
750ml
-0.051 0.425 0.318
(0.374) (0.544) (1.292)
Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape:
500ml
-0.346 0.148 -0.611
(0.389) (0.550) (1.432)
Sensory treatment -0.610∗∗ -0.755∗∗ -0.013
(0.271) (0.322) (0.572)
Information treatment -0.692∗∗ -0.444 -15.860∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.357) (0.610)
Gender 0.388 -0.037 1.278∗
(0.289) (0.368) (0.703)
Age -0.008 0.033∗ -0.016
(0.015) (0.018) (0.042)
Body Mass Index 0.015 -0.048 -0.103
(0.034) (0.039) (0.070)
Education: University student -0.358 0.357 2.112∗∗
(0.441) (0.613) (1.052)
Education: University graduate -0.036 -0.070 0.745
(0.317) (0.462) (0.664)
Education: Post-grad student or
higher
-0.218 0.879 2.651∗
(0.470) (0.753) (1.464)
Household size 0.205∗ 0.012 0.433
(0.113) (0.149) (0.370)
Income: Above average -0.595 -0.302 -2.385
(0.444) (0.569) (1.653)
Income: Average -0.199 -0.519 -0.623
(0.396) (0.554) (1.055)
Income: Below average -0.495 0.297 0.449
(0.506) (0.620) (1.082)
Smoking: No 0.297 0.223 -0.057
(0.278) (0.394) (0.807)
Smoking: I’ve quit 0.650 -0.334 1.654
(0.610) (0.828) (1.870)
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Alcohol consumption: 2 or 3
times per week
0.325 -0.028 0.074
(0.397) (0.459) (0.958)
Alcohol consumption: 4 times a
week or more often
-0.233 0.549 -0.978
(0.482) (0.630) (1.311)
N of drinks in a day: 3 or 4 -0.133 -0.897∗∗ 0.128
(0.392) (0.455) (0.759)
Wine consumption: Once a week 0.024 0.437 -0.881
(0.546) (0.672) (1.409)
Wine consumption: Twice a week -0.106 0.177 0.801
(0.538) (0.656) (1.160)
Wine consumption: 3-4 times a
week
-0.463 -0.177 1.493
(0.567) (0.789) (0.944)
Wine consumption: (almost)
daily
0.122 0.094 -13.830∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.910) (1.423)
Observations 468
Log-likelihood -465.926
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base categories are:
(Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape: 750ml), Visual treatment, Education: up to senior hi-school,
Income: Good or very good, Smoking: Yes, Alcohol consumption: 2 or 4 times per month, N
of drinks in a day: 1 or 2, Wine consumption: Once every 15 days.
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Table A.3: Random effects Tobit model (pomegranate wine) and random effects linear re-
gression model (grape wine) with additional demographics
Pomegranate wine Grape wine
∂E[Bid∗|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|Bid>0,x]
∂x
∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
Constant 15.565∗∗∗ 14.037∗∗∗
(4.403) (4.262)
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape:
500ml
-0.792 -0.687 -0.563 -0.042 -1.567∗
(1.027) (0.890) (0.731) (0.055) (0.894)
Pomegranate: 500ml, Grape:
750ml
1.248 1.141 0.977 0.048 1.274
(1.017) (0.927) (0.795) (0.041) (0.884)
Pomegranate: 750ml, Grape:
500ml
-0.865 -0.749 -0.613 -0.046 -1.566∗
(1.042) (0.901) (0.738) (0.056) (0.910)
Sensory treatment -0.248∗∗ -0.217∗∗ -0.181∗∗ -0.012∗∗ 0.208∗
(0.103) (0.090) (0.075) (0.005) (0.113)
Information treatment -0.030 -0.027 -0.022 -0.001 0.342∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.092) (0.077) (0.005) (0.116)
Endwowment -2.450∗∗∗ -2.155∗∗∗ -1.794∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -1.873∗∗
(0.756) (0.666) (0.562) (0.039) (0.745)
Hedonic evaluation 0.730∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.004) (0.056)
Gender 0.184 0.162 0.135 0.009 -0.117
(0.473) (0.416) (0.346) (0.023) (0.469)
Age 0.032 0.028 0.023 0.002 0.006
(0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.001) (0.026)
Body Mass Index -0.113∗∗ -0.099∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.080
(0.055) (0.048) (0.041) (0.003) (0.054)
Education: University student -1.402∗ -1.206∗ -0.988∗ -0.076 -1.898∗∗
(0.776) (0.654) (0.533) (0.047) (0.762)
Education: University graduate -0.486 -0.430 -0.359 -0.023 -0.679
(0.558) (0.494) (0.413) (0.026) (0.553)
Education: Post-grad student or
higher
0.535 0.485 0.414 0.022 0.541
(0.848) (0.772) (0.663) (0.033) (0.840)
Household size -0.459∗∗ -0.403∗∗ -0.336∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.323∗
(0.201) (0.177) (0.150) (0.010) (0.193)
Income: Above average -0.108 -0.096 -0.080 -0.005 -0.006
(0.746) (0.663) (0.555) (0.035) (0.736)
Income: Average -0.108 -0.096 -0.080 -0.005 0.503
(0.709) (0.630) (0.528) (0.033) (0.698)
Income: Below average -0.779 -0.679 -0.560 -0.040 -0.846
(0.828) (0.721) (0.596) (0.043) (0.820)
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Smoking: No 1.003∗∗ 0.878∗∗ 0.726∗∗ 0.050∗ 1.086∗∗
(0.509) (0.445) (0.370) (0.027) (0.498)
Smoking: I’ve quit 1.155 1.015 0.843 0.057 0.968
(1.038) (0.933) (0.790) (0.046) (1.026)
Alcohol consumption: 2 or 3
times per week
0.213 0.189 0.159 0.010 -0.194
(0.638) (0.566) (0.475) (0.030) (0.628)
Alcohol consumption: 4 times a
week or more often
-0.858 -0.739 -0.608 -0.046 -0.408
(0.850) (0.729) (0.599) (0.046) (0.844)
N of drinks in a day: 3 or 4 0.964 0.861 0.726 0.043∗ 0.705
(0.590) (0.532) (0.452) (0.025) (0.583)
Wine consumption: Once a week -1.336 -1.186 -0.996 -0.061 -1.230
(0.988) (0.892) (0.767) (0.043) (0.932)
Wine consumption: Twice a week -0.837 -0.753 -0.639 -0.036 -0.741
(0.990) (0.902) (0.778) (0.039) (0.928)
Wine consumption: 3-4 times a
week
-0.924 -0.829 -0.702 -0.040 -1.163
(1.022) (0.927) (0.795) (0.042) (0.984)
Wine consumption: (almost)
daily
-0.808 -0.727 -0.617 -0.034 -1.825
(1.198) (1.081) (0.923) (0.050) (1.168)
σu 1.653
∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗
(0.336) (0.312)
σu 2.467
∗∗∗ 2.466∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.167)
σv 1.536
∗∗∗ 1.700∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034)
Observations 1404 1404
Log-likelihood -2757.412 -2983.997
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Base categories are: (Pomegranate:
750ml, Grape: 750ml), Visual treatment, Education: up to senior hi-school, Income: Good or
very good, Smoking: Yes, Alcohol consumption: 2 or 4 times per month, N of drinks in a day:
1 or 2, Wine consumption: Once every 15 days.
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B Appendix: Pictures and other experimental stimuli
Figure B.1: Private booth
(a) Chocolate (b) Biscuits
Figure B.2: Picture stimuli used in training auction rounds
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(a) Pomegranate wine in 500 ml
bottle
(b) Grape wine in 500 ml
bottle
(c) Pomegranate wine in 750 ml bottle (d) Grape wine in 750 ml bottle
Figure B.3: Picture stimuli: Wines in different bottle sizes
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Instructions
[This is a translation of the original instructions written in Greek]
Introduction
Welcome to our survey! It is very important not to communicate with other participants.
Any attempt to communicate will result in the failure of this survey. The session today will last
approximately 90 minutes.
In some parts of the survey you will interact with other participants. However, you will never know
which participant you will be interacting with. In this sense, this survey will be anonymous. If
you have any questions during the session, please raise your hand and the researcher in charge will
answer your question.
The researcher in charge will answer all questions except questions that concern the way you should
behave during the survey. The reason is that no one, including us, can tell you how you should
behave. If we knew that we wouldn’t have to conduct this survey today. All questions should be
addressed to the researcher in private, not in public.
Before we start, I will ask each one of you to draw a three digit number from this cup. This number
is unique for each one of you, as well as for all sessions we will be conducting. That is, this number
is your ID since no other participant in this survey will have the same number as you. This is the
number we will use to pay you.
There are no “right” or “wrong” decisions or answers in this survey. Nevertheless, your actual
income will depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. Our advise is to pay
attention to these instructions. Every participant receives e20 for their presence here today. For
practical reasons, you will receive the money at the end of the session and will be added to your
income as determined by the decisions you make.
Survey description
This survey consists of three different stages. In stage one you will be asked to give the correct
answer in a task. In stage two you will participate in a series of auctions. In this stage you will
also be asked to do sensory evaluations of two wine products. In stage three you will be asked to
choose between different lotteries that can earn you extra money.
After completing stage three, a short questionnaire will follow and your payments will be delivered
to you. After payment you will be free to leave the lab.
1
C Appendix: Experimental Instructions
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Stage 1: The counting task
In the first stage, all participants have to complete a task. The task consists of determining the
right number of zeros in a matrix of 0’s and 1’s. The matrix size (that is, the number of rows and
columns) will be the same for all periods and participants. The task will show up in your screens,
similar to the example image below.
Each participant has 25 seconds to answer. After typing the number, the participant has to confirm
their answer by pressing the button “Entry”. If a participant answers correctly in 25 seconds, s/he
wins e0,5. In any other case s/he wins nothing. This stage will be repeated ten times. Therefore,
if you answer correctly all the times, you can earn up to e5 on top of your participation fees.
2
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Stage 2: The 2nd price auction
In Stage 2 you will participate in a type of auction known as 2nd price auction. This auction has 4
steps:
Step 1: I will describe the auctioned product.
Step 2: Each one of you will submit an offer to purchase the product.
Step 3: The computer will rank the offers from the highest to the lowest.
Step 4: The person with the highest offer purchases the product but will pay the price of
the second highest bidder. If you don not submit the highest bid, you do not purchase the
product.
Think about the following example:
Lets assume that 5 people bid for purchasing a USB memory stick (16 GB). Each person submits
offers separately from other persons. Submitted bids are shown in the following table:
Person Bid
1 15
2 12
3 20
4 18
5 13
After ranking bids from highest to lowest (this will be taken care of by the computer), we have:
Person Bid
3 20
4 18
1 15
5 13
2 12
Person 3 purchases the product because s/he bid the highest bid (20) but will pay 18 (second highest
price). All other participants in the auction pay nothing and do not receive a USB memory stick.
In this type of auction, it is always in your best interest to bid exactly as much as the good is worth
to you. If you bid more than the actual value the good is worth to you, the second highest price
may be higher than what you are willing to pay. In addition, you don’t profit by bidding less
than your real willingness to pay because at the end you might not purchase the product, when in
reality you would be willing to pay the second highest price.
3
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Stage 2: The auction procedure
In the auction stage you will bid for two different products. These two products are two types of
wine. For each type of wine you will separately submit a bid. An example of the screen you’ll see,
is shown below:
In this auction you will participate in groups of 5 people. Each group is independent of
the other and you will not know which person participates in each group. Even though you will
bid simultaneously for the two different wines, at the end we will randomly choose one of the wines
and only decisions you made about the chosen wine will be implemented. For the random choice
we will use a bingo cage with 2 balls numbered with the numbers 1 and 2 which correspond to the
two wines. The random draw will be done separately for each group.
Practically this means that if, for example, you are the highest bidder for Wine 1 but you are not
the highest bidder for Wine 2 and Wine 2 is randomly chosen, then you do not purchase Wine 2.
If, however, Wine 1 was randomly chosen, then you will have to purchase a bottle of Wine 1. That
is, today from this session, you can purchase at maximum one bottle of wine and not more than
one.
An example of the wine auction procedure can be described with the following steps:
Step 1: Each person submits a bid for each wine in separate input fields in their computer screen.
Step 2: The computer ranks bids from highest to lowest, separately for each wine.
Step 3: The second highest bid determines the price at which each wine will be sold to the highest
bidder.
Step 4: The person with the highest bid purchases the wine (in the case where this wine is randomly
chosen) at a price equal to the second highest bid. This price is deducted from overall money
earned by the person. (Note: if there are more than one persons that are the highest bidders,
the computer will randomly choose one of them.)
Step 5: Persons with bids lower or equal to the 2nd highest price do not purchase the wine.
4
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Stage 2: The auction procedure (continued...)
Before the auction you will be asked to evaluate both wines and choose between them.
In the first phase you’ll evaluate the wines with only information the visual appearance of
wines, served on a glass with a serving size of 40 ml. Please note that both wines at this phase will
appear without any other distinct characteristic but will be distinguished by a code number only.
After evaluating the wines, three auctions rounds will follow where in each round you will be asked
to submit a bid for the wines.
In the second phase you’ll evaluate the wines after tasting them. Instructions for tasting the
wines will show up on your computer screen. Attention! The tasting phase is standardized and
must be strictly followed. The computer will inform you which of the two wines you must taste each
time and will provide detailed instructions for the tasting procedure. After evaluating the wines,
three auction rounds will follow where in each round you will be asked to submit a bid for the wines
In the third phase you will be given information for each type of wine. Next, and after
evaluating the wines for a third time, three auction rounds will follow where in each round you will
be asked to submit a bid for the wines.
In total, the auction for the wines will be repeated for 9 rounds. The sequence followed in Stage
2 is graphically depicted in the following flow chart:
Visual appearance
Wine evaluation
3 Auction Rounds
Wine tasting
Wine evaluation
3 Auction Rounds
Wine information
Wine evaluation
3 Auction Rounds
5
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Stage 2: The auction procedure (continued...)
After every auction round you will receive some feedback. The computer will inform you whether
you were or not the highest bidder, as well as whether you submitted the same offer with another
person in case you were the highest bidder.
At the end of the Stage 3 (described momentarily) we will randomly choose one of the wines, using
the method we described previously. In addition, we will choose one round out of the 9 auction
rounds. The draw will be done in front of you, using a bingo cage. In the bingo cage there will be
9 balls numbered from 1 to 9. Then, we will draw one of the balls and the number of the ball will
correspond to the chosen auction round. You will be informed about the chosen auction round only
after you submit all your bids. Therefore, your best strategy is to think of every round as if it is
the binding round.
Next, you will receive feedback about the outcome, that is, whether in that specific auction round
you were the highest bidder or not, whether you’ll purchase a wine or not, which wine you’ll purchase
and at what price.
Before Stage 2 there will be 3 trial rounds in order to familiarize yourself with the auction pro-
cedure. The trial rounds will be about goods that do not exist in the laboratory and since these
rounds will be trial, you can’t buy the goods or pay money for the goods. The purpose of the
trial rounds is simply educational.
6
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Stage 3: Choice between lotteries
In this stage you will be successively shown a sequence of 20 choices. For each choice there are
two alternatives from which you can choose. Each alternative has two monetary amounts and
a probability to win each amount of money. In each choice, the two alternatives will be presented
at the left and right side of the screen. The following picture shows an example.
The left alternative of this example depicts two monetary amounts: e2 and e4. You can earn only
one of these amounts of this alternative. The probability to earn each of these amounts is given as
a percentage (out of 100%) on the right of each amount. The right alternative depicts two different
monetary amounts: e1.30 and e4.50 and their respective probabilities.
7
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Stage 3: Choice between lotteries (continued..)
Each monetary amount has a different color. Colors are use to make clear potential earnings from
each alternative. In addition, alternatives are presented so that the lowest monetary amount is on
the top and the highest monetary amount is on the bottom. Each choice differs from the previous
and the next one with respect to monetary amounts or with respect to probabilities of monetary
amounts. Your task is to choose the alternative you prefer the most.
As shown in the picture below, you have three options in order to state your preference. You can:
a) choose the left alternative b) choose the right alternative and c) state that both alternatives
are indifferent, that is, they are equally preferred. In the latter case, the computer will randomly
pick one of the alternatives for you.
After choosing one of the three options (the respective button will be colored red as a confirmation
of what you chose), you click on the confirmation button to move on to the next choice. In all, you
will make 20 such choices.
Given your choices in the lottery stage, you will receive extra earnings determined like this: When
you are finished with the 20 choices, we will randomly choose one of these choices to be
realized. The computer will then show you the chosen option and the alternative you chose and
will give you feedback for your earnings. You will learn which choice will be realized only after
you choose your preferred alternative for all 20 choices. Therefore, your best strategy is to think of
every choice as if it is the binding choice that will count toward your earnings.
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Stage 3: Earnings from the “Choice between lotteries” stage
For drawing one of the 20 choices randomly, the com-
puter will show you a window like the one shown on the
left. In this window there will be numbers changing
from 1 to 20 very fast (about 1 number/second), which
are selected by the computer randomly. By clicking
on the button, the numbers will stop changing after a
time delay of 1 to 3 seconds. This way, it is impossible
to affect the draw of the number and therefore the
choice of one out of 20 choices is completely
random.
How will you get paid for the drawn choice? A win-
dow like the one shown on the right, will show numbers
changing from 1 to 100 very fast. These numbers are
selected by the computer randomly. By clicking on the
button, the numbers will stop changing after a time delay
of 1 to 3 seconds. This way, it is impossible to affect the
draw of the number and therefore the choice of one out
of 100 is completely random.
The number drawn this way is the chance to win one
of the monetary amounts of the alternative you chose
in the randomly drawn choice. To make this clear, lets review an example shown in the picture on
the left. the alternative shown pays the amount of e4 with probability 80% and the amount of e2
with probability 20%. If the drawn number is between 1 and 80 you will earn e4. If the drawn
number is between 81 and 100 you will earn e2.
After completing Stage 3 you will be asked to fill in a question-
naire. In the meantime we will prepare you payments. Next,
we will give you an envelop with your payment.
9
40
THANK YOY FOR PARTICIPATING IN OUR SURVEY!!
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